Abstract: This paper examines the core features of the EU reform package designed to encourage greater volumes of private enforcement of the EU competition rules, particularly the Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. Its principal objective is not, however, to scrutinize these provisions in detail. Rather, its purpose is to reflect on the questions of why, especially when compared with the position in the US, it has proved so difficult for a culture of antitrust litigation to develop in the EU, why the Commission believed that EU measures were necessary to kindle it and to consider, against that backdrop, whether the EU package is likely to achieve its stated goals.
INTRODUCTION
In order for the objectives of a competition law system to be achieved, effective enforcement of the rules must take place. Without it, the meaning of the law will not be developed and elucidated, breaches of the rules will not be halted, punished or deterred and victims of violations will not be compensated;
1 'deterrence, compensation, and remediation' 2 will not be ensured.
A critical issue to be determined when designing or developing a competition law system is therefore how effective enforcement mechanisms can be established. Many systems rely heavily on public enforcement to protect society's interest in the efficient working of markets. The questions of how public enforcement institutions should be designed, how they can curb and deter infringements and how competition law decisions should be taken, checked and reviewed, has provoked extensive debate and a rich and wide literature.
3 This paper, however, focuses on private enforcement and, in particular, on the questions of whether private enforcement of the rules by those specifically harmed by a competition law violation should be encouraged in the EU (and, if so, how) and how it should interact with public enforcement. These are important issues. Public enforcers have limited resources which they may concentrate principally on ensuring that serious violations which cause wide-spread harm to consumer welfare (such as cartels) are brought to an end and deterred. Accordingly they are not able to root out and prevent all violations of the rules or to ensure compensation for victims. In the EU, for example, the European Commission (the 'Commission') does not have power to award damages to those that have suffered loss in consequence of an antitrust infringement, although it has been active in trying to facilitate private actions by victims for compensation. 4 Private litigation may consequently play a fundamental part in ensuring effective enforcement of the competition law rules.
In the US, Congress made a conscious policy choice when adopting the antitrust laws to encourage private litigants to participate in their enforcement. 5 Over time, and combined with other elements of, and developments in, the US system, the net result of this choice has been that, uniquely in the world, a vast majority of antitrust enforcement in the US (approximately 90% of cases 6 ) emanates from private litigation rather than public enforcement. Such actions arguably play a crucial function decentralising decision-taking, democratising antitrust policy, affirming the rule of law, deterring violations and ensuring that victims obtain compensation. The system has encouraged such high volumes of litigation, however, that it has been felt necessary, through a series of steps, to adjust the system to ensure that some of its perceived excesses are moderated; in particular, to ensure that unmeritorious antitrust litigation is not encouraged which may have the consequence of chilling procompetitive behaviour and so undermining the objectives of the antitrust laws. 7 This position contrasts starkly with that which has existed in the EU. Until 2004, 8 the central role in enforcing Articles 101 and 102 (the 'antitrust' rules) was played by the Commission. 9 Although a key objective of Regulation 1/2003 10 was to allow a more decentralised enforcement system to emerge with the courts and tribunals of the individual Member States (the national courts) (as well as national competition authorities (NCAs)) participating more actively within it, a number of factors have combined to preclude private actions from developing evenly across the EU. Indeed, although litigation is growing rapidly in some Member States, particularly the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, significant barriers to private antitrust actions continue to exist in others.
For many years the Commission has taken the view that the EU situation is unsatisfactory and more needs to be done, whilst avoiding the problems that have confronted the US system, to stimulate and harmonise national rules governing private enforcement and to stimulate a culture of competition within the EU: 'The overall enforcement of the EU 163 . It is difficult to get completely precise statistics relating to the ratio of private to public enforcement however. Because many separate private action cases may be filed in relation to the same case before consolidation, see n 61, there may be overcounting of private actions. In contrast, as many public cases may be resolved before a case is filed, there may be undercounting of government actions. 7 This paper examines the core features of this package. Its principal objective is not, however, to scrutinise these provisions in detail. Rather, its purpose is to reflect on the questions of why, especially when compared with the position in the US, it has proved so difficult for a culture of antitrust litigation to develop in the EU, why the Commission believed that EU measures were necessary to kindle it and to consider, against that backdrop, whether the EU package is likely to achieve its stated goals. Section 2 thus commences by exploring how private enforcement has developed in the US, examining not only the factors that have facilitated and encouraged it, but the extremes widely-believed to have bedevilled and undermined it, 17 and the steps which have consequently been taken to limit and curtail it. Section 3 then examines the EU system and seeks to unpick the different factors that have operated over time as barriers to private litigation in the EU Member States and to identify those that still exist. Having set out the factors that have encouraged and hindered litigation in the US and the EU respectively and the pros and cons of each system, it is possible to reflect more fully on the questions of whether private litigation should be further encouraged in the EU, what measures might be desirable or required to overcome the obstacles which exist to it, what measures should be avoided, whether the current package is likely to succeed, what pitfalls might be anticipated and/or what further developments and clarifications are likely to be required in the future. Section 4 concludes that the package of reforms is not likely to lead to over-enforcement or to the encouragement of unmeritorious antitrust actions in the EU. What may be more of an issue, however, is whether it has done enough to boost and facilitate private damages actions and to create the level playing field across the EU sought by the Commission. Not only does the Directive not institute a completely harmonised framework, leaving a number of potential obstacles to national actions and areas of legal ambiguity outstanding, but a number of the Directive's provisions are liable to introduce considerable complexities into national proceedings. Further, scope for some significant divergences between national rules remain; such differences are likely to continue to affect where litigants choose to commence their actions and to result in forum-shopping. . Although these principles might be criticized on the grounds that they may deny compensation to the real victims of the anticompetitive activity and allow direct purchasers to collect a windfall, they do concentrate antitrust claims in the hands of those most likely to sue, 38 simplify damages' litigation by allowing difficult issues of remoteness and tracing of injury to be side-stepped and reduce the process costs of litigation. 39 In establishing these principles the Supreme Court consequently seemed to elevate the remediation and deterrent functions served by private enforcement, higher than its compensation function.
THE PRIVATE LITIGATION SYSTEM IN THE US
By enlisting in these ways the help of those most directly affected by anticompetitive conduct in the enforcement of the law, numerous antitrust cases have been privately litigated, providing the platform for some of the most significant principles of antitrust law to be developed and for the rapid evolution of the law. Private actions have also been able to fill enforcement gaps, offset periods of lax government enforcement, ensure compensation of victims and that disputes between private parties are resolved privately without drawing public agencies within them.
It is well-known, nonetheless, that the virtues of the private enforcement system are not universally extolled and that its benefits have been hotly-debated. Wide-spread concern has been articulated that, especially in the 1960s-1970s and in relation to class actions, damages' actions got 'out of control' and that such litigation, motivated by private profit rather than public interest considerations, frequently did not achieve its objectives of ensuring meaningful compensation of victims, including smaller businesses and final consumers, and/or of deterring serious violations. Rather, given the combination of claimantfriendly procedural, evidential and substantive rules, 40 the system has been criticised for being prone to error and for encouraging 'anaemic' claims to be brought and settled by defendants eager to avoid protracted and expensive litigation. In addition, there has been concern that private actions might actually undermine public enforcement and deterrence, by discouraging leniency applications.
Although not all might agree with these, or all of these, criticisms, these types of anxiety have led to a dramatic recalibration of the system. Not only has the legislator stepped in in order to diminish the disincentive of submitting amnesty applications, by de-trebling antitrust damages for corporations that participate in the amnesty programme and cooperate with claimants, 41 but the Supreme Court has expressed concerns about the 'coercive' 42 elements of the antitrust system, the risk of false positives they create and handed down a series of opinions which, collectively, limit the types of antitrust claim that can successfully be brought and appreciably raise the bar for antitrust claimants. 43 In 1977, for example, in order to temper the expansive reach of the substantive rules, it introduced a requirement that plaintiffs should establish not only a violation of the law but 'antitrust injury' ('injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent …'); 44 so allowing recovery only for loss stemming from the competition-reducing aspects of the conduct. Subsequently, courts have imposed demanding standards for class certification 45 and the Supreme Court has also 39 In addition, from the defendant's perspective, they preclude a multiplicity of claims and the risks of duplicate recovery from arising, but see n 37 above and text. 40 Especially eg, the right to treble damages, the fact that the defendant never gets its costs, even if it wins, the fact that liability is joint and several with no right to contribution from co-defendants and the expansive use by the Supreme Court of per se rules in the 1960s and 1970s. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the costs of discovery may be astronomical (and are likely to be mainly borne by the defendant) and the opt-out class action system encourages huge volumes of litigation and multiple procedures being launched against alleged anti-trust infringers. 41 The The developments relating to procedure have, in particular, made it easier for antitrust defendants to escape a full antitrust trial either on the basis that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6) motion) 56 or, following discovery, a FRCP 56, on the basis that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' so that 'the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law'.
57 Further, and crucially, there seems little doubt that the perceived 'excesses' of the treble damages system have been an important factor influencing the Supreme Court in its decision over the last 35 years to rein in the substantive reach of the antitrust laws, making it now extremely difficult for private plaintiffs not only to bring antitrust actions but to 'win' 46 (1986) . 50 The Court held that a plaintiff should be able to produce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of a benign hypothesis before its case could be put to a jury. See (2004) . 53 550 US 554, 557 (2007) ("… when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action"). The holding of this case applies more broadly than just to antitrust cases, to private actions more generally. 54 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc 551 US 877 (2007) . 55 433 US 36 (1977) . 56 A FRCP 12(b)(6) motion results in the dismissal of claims that do not allege the facts necessary to sustain a cause of action. It requires 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; FRCP 8(a)(2). 57 The FRCP 56(c).
them. 58 Indeed rule of reason cases are notoriously unattractive for plaintiffs to litigate; given the complexity of the analysis required they are likely to require expert testimony on a range of issues and lengthy and costly trials.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed fear that enforcement should not be permitted to 'chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect' 59 and this concern has influenced its efforts to 'scale back the application of the U.S. antitrust laws. The consequence of getting it wrong -or false positives -is much greater when a firm is exposed to treble, rather than single, damages for its alleged wrongdoing ... These combination of factors has led our Supreme Court to craft increasingly tough liability rules for antitrust offences and increasingly high hurdles for plaintiffs to move beyond the pleadings stage or to survive summary judgment or a directed verdict to get to a jury. The concern is not just that juries will get it wrong, but that the fear of false positives will chill business behaviour that may benefit consumers.' 60 Statistical evidence 61 reflects the impact of these recalibrating measures on antitrust litigation. They illustrate that, although private antitrust actions rose dramatically though the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the number peaked in 1977 (the year that Sylvania 62 was decided and as 'the Court began to embrace "new learning" among antitrust scholars who argued that the antitrust laws were intended to protect competition in order to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare, not to shield small producers from larger, more efficient rivals' 63 ). Since then it has fallen from its apex. 64 Although the number of cases did begin to rise again for a while (mirroring perhaps increased government focus on cartel activity), after 2008 it has fallen again, most likely as a reaction to 'the long string of pro- There is now some concern that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction; the rules are so rigorous and provide so little certainty that meritorious litigation may be being discouraged. As antitrust law has shifted away from clear rules the costs of deciding antitrust cases have been increased without concern 'for the loss of certainty that had been associated with now abandoned per se rules and lenient burdens of proof and the increased party and institutional costs associated with reliance on more demanding standards of proof. Neither has it been concerned with the possibility that the incidence of false negatives could increase due to cost and lack of access to the necessary proof. 69 published a paper 'defying conventional wisdom', rejecting some or the more anecdotal and unsubstantiated concerns about private enforcement and concluding that the private actions studied demonstrated that they had played an important role both in compensating victims and deterring violations. They found not only that the cases analysed (47 of which were opt-out class actions brought through lawyers working for a contingency fee) demonstrated that significant amounts of cash (in excess of $33.8 billion) was returned to victims of anticompetitive behaviour, 70 but it was clear that they had uncovered violations which might otherwise have been undiscovered; a third of the cases examined were standalone actions, actions which did not follow-on from public enforcement, and a number of the follow-on cases extended significantly beyond the parameters of the original government case. This complemented and bolstered their views, articulated in a separate paper, that private antitrust actions deter anticompetitive conduct more effectively even than criminal cartel proceedings pursued by the Department of Justice. 
BARRIERS TO PRIVATE LITIGATION IN THE EU
The US experience indicates that private actions can play an important role in the enforcement process and in ensuring that its compensatory, remediation and/or deterrence functions are achieved. Indeed, a widely held view is now that optimal enforcement requires public and private enforcement to be combined harmoniously. It also demonstrates, however, that it is a delicate and complex task to craft rules (governing procedure, evidence and substance) in a way that will achieve, and balance, the competing objectives pursued and which will minimise error costs. Further, that an important issue to be resolved may be what the primary function of private enforcement should be -deterrence of wrongs which harm society as a whole or compensation of those individuals specifically harmed by the infringement. This sections scrutinises the rights which EU law confers on individuals harmed by an infringement of Article 101 or 102 and the barriers to private litigation that have existed in the EU and which caused the Commission to conclude in 2005 that the system of damages for infringements of competition law of the Member States 'presents a picture of "total underdevelopment"'. 76 and/or are a practicable means of doing so. Nevertheless it has been seen that the Commission concluded that EU instruments to strengthen damages actions, 77 and to balance it with public enforcement, were requisite. In its view the new measures adopted will, by overcoming some barriers to effective redress, 'democratise enforcement and empower the victims of antitrust infringements to receive effective compensation ...'.
78
In order for the EU package to achieve its objectives, it must, of course, successfully tackle the obstacles that exist to national damages' actions, whilst ensuring that the foundations are put in place for workable litigation systems to develop in each Member State which, without harming public enforcement, will minimise error costs. The discussion below consequently considers the combination of factors which have, over the years, conspired against the development of a coherent and uniform enforcement system across the EU and which barriers still remain.
A first important point is that, in contrast to the position in the US, the EEC Treaty, the EC Treaty and the TFEU have all been silent on the question of whether private rights of action for damages or injunctions must follow from a violation of the EU competition law rules; until the Damages Directive was adopted in 2014, no EU legislation specifically addressed private rights of action for damages (or injunctions). Rather, such rights derive, as next described, from the jurisprudence of the ECJ 79 which has developed only in a gradual and piecemeal fashion. . 76 Although final judgments are relatively low, these do not take account of the numerous cases that are settled. See speech K Coates, 'Cartels and Follow On Damages Actions', 24 November 2014 ('Many of these cases settle. I was talking to an economist a few months ago who had advised on -he thought approximately -50 damages calculations. Not one of the cases went to final judgment') and Dunne (n 1). 77 See section 1 above. 78 Speech J Almunia, 'Looking back at five years of competition enforcement in the EU' Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Washington, 10 September 2014. 79 Which are now affirmed in Regulation 1/2003 (n 10) (providing that national courts must have the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 and for cooperation between the national courts and the Commission and consistency in interpretation of the provisions by all decision-takers). 80 Fourth, even post-Crehan private litigation has been, and is still being deterred by the fact that the principle of national procedural autonomy 91 confers considerable latitude on the national systems and the national courts in dealing with an antitrust damages claim.
92
The protection given to EU rights is, consequently, heavily dependent on the procedural, evidential, and substantive rules governing civil litigation applicable in each particular Member State and how EU law -in particular the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 93 -is considered to constrain their operation. 94 In the absence of EU Rewe-Zentralfinanz (n 84) (('in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law'). 92 See obstacles identified by the Commission in its Green Paper (n 12). 93 The rules must not be less favourable than those relating to similar claims of a domestic nature (the principle of equivalence); and must not make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights that the national courts are obliged to protect (the principle of effectiveness).
harmonising measures, 95 therefore, considerable opacity has surrounded a multiplicity of questions, including, how national claims should be framed (and in particular whether fault should or can be a constituent element of the cause of action), how causation can be established and damages calculated, whether national courts are required (or permitted) to award 'punitive' damages and whether other national rules governing the claim comply with EU law and, especially, the principle of effectiveness; for example, rules relating to standing, remoteness, illegality, a passing on defence or setting out limitation periods. The ECJ has been requested to give rulings on some of these issues, 96 but where no specific judgment exists, the position remains subject to differing interpretations and, accordingly, uncertainty. For instance, the question of whether EU law demands that indirect purchasers should have standing to bring antitrust proceedings and/or whether defendants should be able to raise a passing on defence, would appear to depend on how the principle of effectiveness stressed in the ECJ's Crehan and Manfredi judgments is to be construed: specifically, whether it suggests that the principal purpose of private enforcement is the attainment of corrective justice 97 -with deterrence operating merely as a socially beneficial by-product of such actions 98 -or whether it primarily a tool to increase enforcement and to bring to an end and deter violations. 99 Although the Court has stressed the importance of private actions to the strengthening of the working of the competition rules and to the maintenance of effective competition, 100 in Manfredi the ECJ also clarified '... that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article [101] '.
101
Fifth, although the principles of equivalence and effectiveness may require some rules, 102 which render nugatory the right to compensation, to be struck down or disapplied, 103 the extent to which EU law can require Member States more positively or proactively to facilitate damages claims and to put in place measures, or reform institutions in a way, which would ensure an effective enforcement framework is even less clear-cut and even more controversial. 104 In particular, the existence, or not, of specialist competition law tribunals or courts, the speed of litigation and individual national rules governing access to information and evidence, litigation costs, funding and cost rules, follow-on actions, mechanisms for collective redress and remedies for final consumers are all factors which may dramatically affect the culture of competition and the feasibility of successfully launching private litigation. Thus, even if, for example, it were clear that EU law demands that indirect purchasers should be able to seek compensation before a national court, such a right might be worthless in a state where the national tools are inadequate to allow that right to be effectively exercised -perhaps because procedural mechanisms do not allow for actions to be grouped together collectively or for relevant evidence to be uncovered, collected or appropriately processed and assessed. In some jurisdictions individuals may simply be less litigious than in others. 105 Indeed, it seems clear that features of the national litigation systems in the individual Member States have been deterring or constraining EU claimants. In particular:
the cost and risk of litigation frequently operates as a deterrent, especially where claimants have not suffered much loss individually and where class or other consolidated actions and contingency fees are not available 106 or where national cost rules provide disincentives to litigation (e.g., where claimants are obliged to pay the defendant's legal costs if unsuccessful); 107 it is extremely difficult for claimants to gather the requisite evidence under many national systems; the question of when national courts can order disclosure vary considerably between Member States; 108 proceedings may be being deterred in some States by uncertainty over the weight to be given to decisions of NCAs; many national courts have limited experience dealing with antitrust arguments and may not, consequently, be the most appropriate or understanding forum for the hearing. 109 Sixth, a matter of specific contention in the EU has been the relationship between public and private enforcement which are closely connected. As in the US, not only do public enforcement actions by the Commission have a facilitating effect on private enforcement (a Commission decision finding a competition law infringement may be relied upon to establish the existence of a breach 110 and may provide evidence helpful in establishing causation and harm 111 ) but it has been recognised that private actions can reinforce public enforcement by increasing the resources available for the prosecution of competition law infringements, the likelihood of detection and the cost of non-compliance. The interaction between the two enforcement systems has however become strained. In particular, tensions have arisen between the need to ensure, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the right to compensation available to victims of anti-competitive practices and, on the other, the effectiveness of the leniency programme, which constitutes a key tool for the Commission in its fight against cartels and, consequently to public enforcement. 112 Litigants in the EU have frequently sought access to leniency evidence not only through discovery but through seeking access to a competition agency's file or by filing a claim under transparency rules. 113 Although the Commission, supported by some NCAs and Advocate General Mazák, has taken the view that access should not be granted to selfincriminating statements voluntarily provided by leniency applicants as this could substantially reduce the attractiveness of the leniency programme and, in turn, the effective enforcement of Article 101, 114 in Pfleiderer, 115 the ECJ favoured a more balanced approach to the question. It held that a national court had, in deciding whether to grant access to leniency documents, to weigh, according to national law and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case, 116 the respective interests of the leniency applicant (to have voluntarily submitted corporate statements protected) and the claimant (to have access to documents which would facilitate the claim).
117 Building on this approach the ECJ in Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie, 118 held that 'in competition law... any rule that is rigid, either by providing for absolute refusal to grant access … or for granting access as a matter of course . . . is liable to undermine the effective application of … Article 101'.
119
Although these cases stressed that the national court should have the opportunity to consider the issues on a case-by-case basis weighing the competing interests, in EnBW 120 the Court recognised that access should be required only in cases of absolutely necessity where relevant evidence was not available from alternative mechanisms.
In section 3 it has been seen that although, as cases have come before it, the ECJ has developed and clarified the rights that Articles 101 and 102 confer on private persons, uncertainty still surrounds many issues relating to how national rules should guarantee real and effective judicial protection for those rights and what limitations and obligations EU imposes on national law governing the claim. Consequently, the ability of claimants to recover damages in antitrust cases diverges significantly between Member States. Further, a tension between private and public enforcement has been emerging.
Because of the close connection between private and public enforcement and their ability to impact on each other, public enforcement agencies frequently take a keen interest in the development of private enforcement. Indeed, it has been seen that, in the EU, it has been the Commission which has spearheaded the campaign to encourage greater private enforcement of the EU antitrust laws, whilst at the same time stressing that it should not adversely impact on public enforcement. It has been facilitated in this task by its unique and unusual position of having separate and central roles within the EU legal order both as a competition enforcement agency and as the EU institution which formulates most legislative proposals (including those to promote the effective application of competition law).
In considering what EU measures should be enacted to overcome the EU barriers to litigation and to stimulate, and harmonise, private damages actions the Commission has had a tortuous path to navigate, both politically and legally. Not only has it had to convince the Parliament 121 and the Council that EU legislation was required which encroaches on traditional national litigation systems and entrenched principles developed within them, 122 but it has had to reflect on an array of factors when considering what those measure should look like and what they should cover. In addition to seeking to overcome the barriers to litigation identified it has had to consider: what legislative proposals would realistically be accepted, how it should balance the potential deterrent, compensatory and other functions of private actions; how it should balance private and public enforcement; whether it should adopt a more holistic, all-encompassing, or a more gradual, sequential approach; and how to encompass lessons emerging from the US experience and to safeguard against an unleashing of some of the excesses connected with the litigation culture developed there. 123 It has therefore had to exercise caution to ensure that, in seeking to bolster and encourage private enforcement in the EU, rules are not made so claimant friendly that antitrust litigation gets out of control and encourages undeserving claims to be commenced (creating the risk of false positives). 124 Were that to occur, courts might become inclined to adopt narrow constructions of substantive and procedural rules making it harder for public enforcement agencies, 125 as well as private litigants, to establish violations.
A brief examination of the package of EU measures illustrates how the Commission and the legislature have resolved some of these difficult issues presented. A first 121 A first Directive proposed by the Commission in 2009 was based on Art 103 TFEU and would have excluded the Parliament from the legislative procedure. In the end the Directive was adopted under Arts 103 and 114, so requiring use of the co-decision procedure. 122 In some Member States, eg Germany, there has been resistance to the introduction of disclosure rules on the basis that litigation proceeds on the basis that it is for the claimant to prove its case, see A Howard, 'Too little, too late? The European Commission's Legislative Proposals on Anti-Trust Damages Actions' (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 455, 460. The author is suspicious that the extent of compromises in the Directive and the rather timid selection of the procedural issues is linked to political concerns regarding the sanctity of national procedural autonomy, ibid 464. 123 See, eg, the responses to the Commission's Green Paper (n 12). 124 A choice may have to be made as to whether false positives or negatives are worse. 125 See eg, WE Kovacic, 'Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws' (London, May, 15, 2003) , available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/030514biicl.shtm>. point is that the Commission has taken the view that legislation governing damages action was required to clarify and harmonise certain issues (only minimum harmonisation). Although therefore some matters have been dealt with primarily through soft recommendations and guidance, others have been dealt with through harmonising legislation, the Directive, which has to be transplanted into national law by the end of 2016.
Second, the Directive has generally embraced the compensatory approach, 126 reflecting the Commission's articulated view that, public and private enforcement should pursue different, albeit complementary, objectives and that all victims of antitrust violations, including SMEs and consumers, direct and indirect purchasers, should be able to obtain full compensation (but not over-compensation). The Directive clarifies that:
it 'sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law by an undertaking … can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation for that harm from that undertaking …'; 127 national courts 'shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm'; 128 full compensation shall 'cover the right to compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, plus the payment of interest'
129 but 'shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types of damages'; 130 indirect, as well as direct, purchasers can sue (and indeed in some cases overcharges are presumed to be passed on to them by direct purchasers); 131 and as overcompensation must not ensue, national courts must ensure the passing on defence is available to defendants. 132 Recognising the complexity that is likely to follow for national courts in applying a passing-on defence, the Directive provides that '[t]he Commission shall issue guidelines for national courts on how to estimate the share of the overcharge which was passed on to the indirect purchaser'.
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Third, the Directive has sought to tackle some (but not all) of the practical difficulties which have been confronting victims of EU antitrust infringements, to encourage damages actions and to establish certain minimum standards for litigation throughout the EU. It addresses the problem of information asymmetry and that disclosure is not widely available in some Member States by providing that, subject to certain conditions, national courts must be able to order a defendant (or claimant) to disclose relevant evidence under its control where a request is accompanied by a reasoned justification sufficient to support its plausibility.
134 National courts must however limit disclosure of evidence to that which is proportionate and must protect confidential information and give full effect to legal professional privilege.
The Directive also clarifies that: a finding of an infringement by a NCA or a review court should be irrefutably established for the purposes of damages' claims based on it before a national court in that state (so in these follow-on actions a claimant will have to establish only causation, loss and the quantum of damages, 135 not the existence of the breach); 136 national limitation periods must not be less than five years and cannot commence to run before the infringement has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know of it (it must also be suspended or interrupted until public enforcement proceedings are terminated); 137 and undertakings responsible for an infringement through joint behaviour, should (except for certain SMEs and immunity recipients) be jointly and severally liable for the infringement. 138 Further, it establishes a rebuttable evidential presumption of harm in cartel cases 139 and empowers national courts to estimate the amount of harm in cases where precise quantification is impossible or excessively difficult. 140 The Commission's practical guide on the quantification of harm for damages is specifically designed to assist national courts in this sphere. 141 Fourth, in order to ensure that such actions do not disrupt public enforcement, the Directive overrides the case-law of the ECJ 142 and limits national rules governing disclosure by providing an absolute bar on the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions. 143 Finally, the Directive incorporates provisions relating to consensual dispute resolution.
This brief summary (see also the table set out in the Annex below) indicates that over-enforcement cannot be anticipated as a consequent of the current reforms. The US 'toxic cocktail', consisting of, in particular, class actions, contingency fee arrangements, favourable attorneys' fees rules, treble damages, broad discovery, jury trials and the rule of joint and several liability, with no right of contribution, are not provided for in the Directive. 144 Rather, it prohibits over-compensation, seeks to avoid fishing exercises by restricting disclosure to scenarios where a request for evidence is plausible, provides for joint and several liability (with some limits but a general right to contribution from other infringers) and does not deal with attorney fees, jury trials or class actions (the latter being dealt with only by a recommendation). Although one concern could be that as substantive EU antitrust laws are interpreted more broadly than their US counterparts in some areas, such as vertical restraints and unilateral conduct, there is a danger that greater volumes of private action will create a risk of false positives, the EU package, does not provide huge additional incentives to the launch of these types of claim. Rather, many of its more detailed provisions focus on measures designed to stimulate actions in cartel damages cases; indeed, its provisions seem likely to have greatest impact in follow-on cases. Further, it could be argued that these are areas where litigation should be encouraged, as few competition agencies have sufficient resources to dedicate towards enforcement in these spheres.
Greater concern may thus centre on the question raised at the beginning of this chapter as to whether the reforms have done enough to overcome the impediments to litigation and to achieve the Commission's objectives of increasing, and harmonising, private damages actions across the EU. Three core problems seem potentially to exist. First, because the Commission has not adopted a holistic approach, attempting to introduce a completely harmonised framework, 145 a number of significant obstacles to national actions and areas of legal ambiguity appear to remain. For example, the Directive does not contain provisions dealing with the admissibility of economic evidence, causation, remoteness and quantification of damages (dealt with only in the form of a non-binding practical guide). These rules will consequently continue to be governed by national law, subject to their compliance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Further, although the Commission hopes that the introduction of a set of common principles in the field of collective redress will help to ensure that effective compensation is obtained by final consumers and SMEs in mass harm situations, its ability to bolster the position of such consumers is uncertain. Not only does the Recommendation on collective redress take the form of 'soft law', but the recommendation is simply that collective redress systems should, as a general rule, be based on the 'opt-in' principle (under which claimant parties are formed through directly expressed consent of their members). A valid concern may therefore be that such classes will encompass only a small percentage of antitrust victims. 146 Second, even where harmonising rules have been adopted, there still seems to be significant scope for divergence in national rules in some areas. For example, given diverse national approaches to disclosure it seems possible that different interpretations will be adopted to the Directive's requirements relating to the plausibility and proportionality of a request for disclosure. Further, the Directive leaves Member States the opportunity to introduce more favourable national rules in some situations. It seems likely that, a number of Member States will take opportunities to facilitate private actions, for example, by adopting more generous rules relating to disclosure, limitation periods and class actions. The existence of national differences is therefore likely to continue to affect where litigants choose to commence their actions and to result in forum-shopping. 145 Howard (n 122) 456 ('At first glance, the proposed Directive appears to be a random selection of minimum procedural requirements that lack coherence or structure. This is not a blueprint set of procedural rules that govern damages actions from start to finish.') Although the Directive is based on both Arts 103 and 114 TFEU (n 121) (to ensure that the differences in the liability regimes applicable in the Member States do not negatively affect both competition and the proper functioning of the internal market), arguably it simply provides a guarantee that a minimum set of rules will govern actions across the EU rather than providing a set of harmonised rules. 146 See Lande (n 7) 6 (recovery in the EU will also be severely limited if lawyers are not allowed to receive contingency fees; 'the vast majority of consumer-victims and small business-victims' may therefore 'continue to be uncompensated').
Third, a legitimate anxiety may be that the working of a number of the Directive's provisions will introduce considerable complexities into national proceedings (for example, as the courts grapple with the complex rules applicable to limitation, joint and several liability and passing on) so detracting from its goal of facilitating them.
Despite some concerns, it is clear that the Commission and the EU legislature have taken a bold first step in the journey towards encouraging damages claims throughout the EU and the development of a coherent EU system governing them. Indeed, it arguably constitutes the 'most complete vertical example of European tort law to date'. 147 The Commission has worked hard to avoid the pitfalls experienced in the US and the new framework lays the foundations for the law in this area to develop sequentially as the EU and national courts interpret and assess the full implications of the provisions in cases arising before them. It is to be expected, therefore, that private actions in Europe will gradually become more commonplace. Whether the package of reforms will be a significant success, however, and/or whether further measures will be required, remains to be seen
